By
New Immigration Era
What One Case Reveals
For most of the past three decades, immigration enforcement in America operated on a set of priorities. Violent criminals, drug traffickers, and national security threats were the targets.
Everyone else existed in a gray zone, tolerated by policy if not by law.
The Trump administration has made clear, in executive orders, agency directives, and daily enforcement actions, that the old hierarchy no longer applies. Green cards can be revisited. Visas can be suspended. The question is no longer whether someone committed a crime — it is whether they belong here at all.
DHS Policy Memorandum PM-602-0192, issued December 2, 2025, formalized that shift — directing a re-review of foreign nationals granted immigration benefits who entered the United States on or after January 20, 2021. Thousands of cases are in play.
Most of those cases will remain abstractions — statistics, policy debates, arguments on cable news. But policy always lands somewhere. It lands on a person, a file, a set of facts.
It has landed, among other places, on Stefanya Ramirez Ospina.
Ospina is a 31-year-old Colombian national who holds a U.S. green card, lives primarily outside the country, and until recently was known mainly to her Instagram followers — where she posted cheerfully about selling Toyotas in America. She is not, on the surface, the kind of case that makes headlines.

But a memorandum filed with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement — and leaked to Frank Report — suggests her case contains nearly every element the current administration has identified as grounds for removal: immigration fraud, financial crimes, abandonment of residency, and alleged ties to MS-13.
Her case may be small. What it illustrates is not.
The Instagram Post

A removal request filed with federal immigration enforcement targets a Colombian green card holder — alleging fraud, abandonment, and MS-13 ties. Her Instagram, meanwhile, shows her selling Toyotas in America.
Stefanya Ramirez Ospina had a message for her Instagram followers.
“My first car in the USA on credit,” she wrote in Spanish, her face on camera, a Toyota logo behind her. She listed a U.S. phone number — (251) 269-6092 — and invited anyone who wanted a car or truck to reach out. She would get them the deal of their dreams.
It was a cheerful post. It was also, according to a federal removal request, a window into a double life.
The memorandum, filed with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and obtained exclusively by Frank Report, calls for the immediate deportation of Ospina, a Colombian national who holds a U.S. permanent resident card issued April 2, 2021. ICE has her file.
Among the grounds for removal: abandonment. According to the filing, Ospina spent two weeks in the United States in 2025. In prior years: six weeks in 2021, nine weeks in 2022 and 2023, and seven weeks in 2024. She has never filed U.S. taxes.
Under immigration law, a permanent resident who fails to maintain the U.S. as her primary country of residence can be stripped of that status and removed. The threshold is 180 days per year. USCIS issued her card in April 2021. She has not come close to the threshold in any year since.
The Victim
Her husband, Jason Russell Williams, a physician and founder of Williams Cancer Institute, which operates across Georgia, California, and Mexico, sponsored her green card. The couple married in Colombia in May 2017. After a years-long processing period, Ospina received her green card in April 2021.
In August 2025, a wave of employee whistleblowers came forward to tell Williams that Ospina and her father, Julian Ramirez Lopez, had been stealing from him for more than three years.
Williams cooperated with the filing and with providing DHS with documentation, audio recordings, and whistleblower statements.
What the Whistleblowers Saw
Three employees of Williams Cancer Institute’s Latin American operations have provided statements to ICE describing how the scheme worked, how they were drawn into it, and why they remained silent for as long as they did.
The first statement describes the moment the irregularities became impossible to ignore:
“Since I joined the company, I began to notice certain irregularities related to the monthly payments, which I initially assumed were salary payments for the employees. However, over time it became evident that large sums of money were being transferred to my personal account and were recorded as payments intended for members of the Ramírez Ospina family, without clearly specifying the reason or the corresponding accounting concept.”
The employee continued:
“These transfers disproportionately increased my reported income to the State, creating a false fiscal image and forcing me to file an income tax return with amounts much higher than what I had actually earned.”
A second employee provided a chronological account of the operation, dating it to 2022:
“Until October 2023, and following the instructions of Mr. Julian Ramírez López, a monthly transfer was made to one of the team members from the Latin area. That person received the total amount corresponding to the salaries and then distributed the payments to each employee. The remaining funds were returned to Mr. Julian’s account, either as surplus or as part of the expenses related to Dr. Jason’s estate.”
The same employee described how Lopez used staff to launder his expenses:
“There was also a practice where Mr. Julian Ramírez López made business payments using his personal credit card, since certain platforms did not accept American Express cards belonging to Mr. Julian Ramírez López. For this reason, his card was used to make payments for services and tools such as CloudTalk, EmailerPro, Bubble, Progressier, as well as domain renewals and other web services linked to Williams Cancer Institute on platforms like GoDaddy and Wompi. These amounts paid with his personal card were later reimbursed to him by adding the equivalent values to company invoices.”

When the Banks Noticed
The third statement describes what happened when the banking system itself began to push back — and how the scheme adapted:
“However, this method caused several issues, as it affected employees’ personal bank accounts. I am aware of cases in which some colleagues experienced account blocks for international transfers and were even blacklisted by Bancolombia, which likely affected their ability to access other banking services permanently.”
To work around banking blocks, an engineer at the company, Daniel Perdomo, proposed routing payments through DolarApp, a transfer platform that operates in partnership with U.S. banks, including Lead Bank. Starting in October 2023, DolarApp became the payroll delivery platform for Latin American employees, each assigned a U.S. bank account through the service.
The irregularities continued under the new system. As the third employee wrote:
“In my particular situation, my account was frequently used to receive transfers unrelated to my salary. According to the explanations I occasionally received, these funds were intended for matters related to the farm or, at times, personal affairs of the Ramírez family in connection with Dr. Jason Williams. Most of the transfers came from SD WILLIAMS CANC, and on two occasions, from Capital One. Subsequently, these non-payroll funds were transferred to the account indicated by Mr. Julián López, generally his own. The transfer amounts ranged between $2,000 and $7,000 USD.”
The employee noted that the $7,000 ceiling was the per-transaction limit imposed by DolarApp. Lopez was structuring the transfers to stay beneath it.
DolarApp noticed. The third employee wrote:
“DolarApp contacted me to request explanations regarding such movements, particularly concerning the funds sent to Mr. Julián López. After providing the requested information, the platform decided to permanently close my account, banning me indefinitely and preventing me from opening any new accounts within their system.”
Why They Said Nothing
All three employees offered the same explanation for why they had not come forward sooner. As the first put it:
“I am aware that I was not the only one affected by this situation; however, none of us ever filed a complaint due to fear of possible retaliation.”
The third employee echoed this:
“We did not openly object to these practices mainly for two reasons: first, because the instructions came from our supervisors or superiors, whom we followed and believed in good faith; and second, due to an unconscious fear that questioning such practices could result in negative consequences for our employment.”
A Fraudulent Visa Application — Before This Began

The removal request reaches back a decade, to a time before Ospina had any connection to Williams — and to an attempt to deceive U.S. immigration authorities.
In a visa application submitted around December 2015, Ospina provided false information about her father’s identity, substituting the name, personal details, and bank account records of a different individual — someone with substantial financial resources — to present herself as financially stable and well-connected. She falsified documents and impersonated another tourist family to obtain a U.S. tourist visa.
It didn’t work. The State Department denied the application in May 2016.
The MS-13 Connection
The removal filing raises one more allegation — and from a national security standpoint, the most serious of all.
The memorandum states that Ospina and Lopez have contacts and relationships with the MS-13 gang in Mexico. Prior to her marriage, Ospina had a relationship with an MS-13 gang member — the connection traced to Mexico City around December 2015 — and claimed to have been used to purchase illegal drugs. The filing characterizes these ties as a threat to U.S. security.
What ICE Is Being Asked to Do

The memorandum requests that ICE issue a Notice to Appear for both Ospina and Lopez, initiating removal proceedings, and that DHS suspend all U.S. travel and residency rights pending a review under DHS Policy Memorandum PM-602-0192, issued December 2, 2025, which directed re-review of foreign nationals granted immigration benefits who entered the U.S. on or after January 20, 2021.
Lopez holds a B1/B2 visitor visa set to expire March 11, 2028. The filing also requests that it be suspended.
Neither Ospina nor Lopez responded to requests for comment. ICE neither confirmed nor denied opening proceedings.
An official with the Trump administration indicated that he expects ICE to take action based on the severity of the theft and the blatant abuse of a reputed physician with an impeccable record.
Whether ICE acts on this file will say something about how the new enforcement era works in practice. The Trump administration has promised that cases like this one, once ignored, will no longer be.
Frank Report will follow every development.
ARTVOICE ART






Further Reading
The New Immigration Era
— DHS Policy Memorandum PM-602-0192, explained: Greenberg Traurig immigration analysis
— Full scope of the freeze and how it works in practice: lawfirm4immigrants.com
Green Card Abandonment — The Legal Standard
— What the 180-day rule actually means and how abandonment is determined: CitizenPath
— The legal factors CBP considers when questioning a returning resident: CLINIC — Catholic Legal Immigration Network
MS-13 — Designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization
— U.S. State Department designation of MS-13 as a Foreign Terrorist Organization: State.gov
— MS-13’s Mexico Program — how the gang operates across the border: InSight Crime
— DOJ on MS-13’s smuggling operations through Mexico: Washington Times
— ICE/FBI arrest of high-ranking MS-13 leader controlling U.S. and Mexico operations: ICE.gov
DolarApp — The Transfer Platform at the Center of the Scheme
— What DolarApp is and how it works: Y Combinator launch page
— Note: DolarApp has since rebranded as ARQ. Its partner bank is Lead Bank.
See also